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 Each console 
manages one 
subsystem
 Flight Controllers
 Specialize in 
operations 
 Complete a 
documented 
training and 
evaluation plan 
for MCC ops
 Divide time 
between office 
(plan, train)  and 
console (fly)
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5Lessons Learned
Program 
Requirements 
and Objectives
Train
-Final Analysis
-Requirements 
Integration
-Crew/Flight 
Controller Training
-Next Worse Case 
Failure Preparation
Fly
-Safety of Crew, 
Vehicle, Mission
-Implement 
Requirements
Plan
-Vehicle design – flyable, 
sensible, operable?
-Analysis
-Within experience base?
-New hardware/software 
required?
-New Ops Products required?
-New Flight Controller/Crew 
Training required?
-Overall plan 
operable/supportable?
 All aspects of P/T/F embedded in Lessons Learned culture
 Encode, Duplicate successes
 Learn from, Avoid mistakes
 All aspects of P/T/F provide feedback to the Program on the risks/concerns/recommendations 
of Program Requirements and Objectives
 Leadership – Leadership is aligned and effective deep within the organization
 Leadership in Mission Control
 Unambiguous chain of command within MCC-H and between Control Centers
 Leadership within a discipline is expected on and off console; “Lead Your Leader” 
reflects our goal for leadership development at all levels
 Design – The structure is lean and reflects the organization’s strategic focus
 Design in Mission Control 
 Documented processes, training flows, and certification guides establish both the ends 
and the means; regularly reviewed to ensure the methods align with changing strategic 
goals
 People – The organization effectively translates business strategy into a powerful 
people strategy, attracting and retaining the most capable individuals
 People in Mission Control
 Selective recruiting, Flight Controller Boot Camp, progressively complex training and 
simulations, regular skills assessments and pass/fail evaluations with documented 
pass/fail criterion
Source: Bhalla, Vikram; Caye, Jean-Michel; Dyer, Andrew; Dymond, Lisa; Morieux, Yves; Orlander, Paul 
(2011). “High-Performance Organizations, The Secrets of Their Success,” Used with permission 6
 Change Management – The organization can drive and sustain large-scale 
change and anticipate and adapt
 Change Management in Mission Control
 Mission Control is a balance between being nimble enough to adapt to 
unexpected change yet knowledgeable enough to ascertain whether the 
change is within accepted limits; Next Worse Failure planning
 Culture and Engagement – The culture is shaped to achieve strategic 
goals.  Employees pursue corporate objectives.
 Culture and Engagement in Mission Control
 Flight Controller Manifesto, Stone Tablets of Flight Control, Foundations of 
Flight Operations, Plan/Train/Fly, Next Worse Failure, Lessons Learned JOPs
7
Source: Bhalla, Vikram; Caye, Jean-Michel; Dyer, Andrew; Dymond, Lisa; Morieux, Yves; Orlander, Paul 
(2011). “High-Performance Organizations, The Secrets of Their Success,” Used with permission
 August 2012: HTV grapple fixture stuck on the 
ISS robot arm as the arm backed away
 Caused HTV to drift towards ISS, resulting in an 
unexpected automated abort
 HTV-4 scheduled for August 2013, 9 months 
later: 
 Don’t let HTV-3 happen again!
 What happened, why, how do we prevent it?
 Cannot change HTV vehicle design
 ISS Program, Engineering, Flight Operations, 
Canada, Japan needed to fully engage
 Key to on-time success – operating as a High 
Performing Org
▪ Assemble to agree on direction/priorities, release 
teams to do work, reassemble to assess/integrate 
results and agree on next step(s)
Orbital 
Mechanics
Direction of 
Initial SSRMS 
motion “pull”
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 Mission Control is a “High Reliability 
Organization”
 Characteristics of successful organizations in 
high-risk industries
 Preoccupation with Failure
 Reluctance to Simplify Interpretations
 Sensitivity to Operations
 Commitment to Resilience
 Deference to Expertise
Source:  Weick, Karl E.; Kathleen M. Sutcliffe (2001). Managing the Unexpected - Assuring High Performance 
in an Age of Complexity. San Francisco, CA, USA: Jossey-Bass. pp. 10–17. ISBN 0-7879-5627-9
Anticipation
(Prevention)
Containment
(Reacting)
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 Crew reported ‘snow flakes’ outside
 MCC-H saw a large increase in a 
previously slow NH3 leak
 Program decided to execute a 
contingency spacewalk (EVA) in 2 
days to replace a pump
 We had never done an EVA in so 
short a time!
 EVAs typically take 12+ months to plan and train
 “Critical Contingency EVAs” need at least 9 days
 Decision to do it so quickly based on
 Catch the leak while it was still leaking
 Before a crewmember returned to Earth in a Soyuz 
in 5 days
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EVA is the most dangerous activity in human spaceflight 
outside of launch, entry, and landing
Two separate schools of safety said we were asking for an 
accident:
1. Hollnagel’s Efficiency-Thoroughness Trade-Off (ETTO) 
 Never have enough time/ resources, so people must trade 
between efficiency and thoroughness
▪ Not doing the documented process -> variation -> error
 We certainly were rushed
2. Dekker’s Drift into Failure
 With very complex systems teams stove-pipe expertise/ 
processes and then hand-off products
▪ Teams make locally rational decisions that don’t make sense in the 
global context
 We certainly had a lot of teams over several shifts making locally 
rational decisions
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Because we were mindful that we had 
the right …
 Circumstances
 Sensitivity to Operations
 Processes
 Reluctance to Simplify Interpretations
 Culture
 Preoccupation with Failure
 Commitment to Resilience
 Deference to Expertise
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 EVAs 18, 19 and 20 set us up
 Fall 2012; one was contingency
 Many controllers had 
worked together
 Several had experience 
in contingency planning 
 Astronauts were very experienced at this 
worksite
 Only leak location we could repair was the 
pump
 FOD, Engineering, ISS Program were already 
familiar with the technical details
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 ETTO says you need diversity of mental models
 Drift into Failure says someone needs “The Big 
Picture” and to integrate across ‘silos’
 ‘Matrix mgmt’ is how we institutionalized these
 Teams had to work  
 Across disciplines (EVA, SPARTAN, Engineering, etc)
▪ Different mental models : “that is not what we need”
 Within disciplines 
▪ Same mental models : “that is not what I thought”
 Leadership (HPO trait) at all levels enables Flight 
Directors and Program Managers to remain at the ‘Big 
Picture’ level to ask “Have you considered …”
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 You are allowed to be wrong
 Experts can make mistakes, co-ops can make big saves
 It is a team event
 “All in” event (engagement) – even if one person’s role was 
simply making sure there were ample snacks to help reduce 
stress
 Leaders had to delegate tasks and trust the answers that came 
back
 Okay and expected to have someone look over your 
shoulder (design)
 It is okay to be the ‘squeaky wheel’
 Even if you know that it might mean causing a team to have to 
start over or perform major rework
 EVA is one of the most dangerous things we do
 Solving/Fixing the problem is not nearly as important as the 
Priority 1 task – getting the crew back inside alive
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 Because we did it once does not mean 
we can do it again
 How are these circumstances different than what 
we had in EVA 21?
 Do we still have the same processes?
 Is our culture different?
 How can we decide if we would (would 
not) be as safe as we were for EVA 21? 
 Start from the beginning of the process and do 
not rely on “it worked before”
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 HROs and HPOs can exist independently 
 When an organization implements both, results can be 
considerably compounded
 Leadership in High Reliability and High Performing 
Organizations often means 
 Stepping back and letting others lead while at the same time 
retaining overall leadership and integration authority
 Never relying solely on “what worked before” to get you 
through a situation
 Ensuring both the failures and the successes of today enable the 
team to do it even better next time by performing “after action” 
reviews with defined actions for improvement
 Continuous Improvement is a way of life
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1. To instill within ourselves these qualities essential to professional 
excellence
 Discipline…Being able to follow as well as to lead, knowing that we must master 
ourselves before we can master our task.
 Competence…There being no substitute for total preparation and complete dedication, for 
flight will not tolerate the careless or indifferent.
 Confidence…Believing in ourselves as well as others, knowing that we must master fear 
and hesitation before we can succeed.
 Responsibility…Realizing that it cannot be shifted to others, for it belongs to each of us; 
we must answer for what we do or fail to do.
 Toughness…Taking a stand when we must; and to try again and again, even if it means 
following a more difficult path.
 Teamwork…Respecting and using the abilities of others, realizing that we work toward a 
common goal, for success depends upon the efforts of all.
 Vigilance...Being always attentive to the dangers of flight; never accepting success as a 
substitute for rigor in everything we do.
2. To always be aware that, suddenly and unexpectedly, we may find ourselves 
in a role where our performance has ultimate consequences.
3. To recognize that the greatest error is not to have tried and failed, but that, in 
the trying, we do not give it our best effort. 20
I. Come prepared for your shift. Understand how your discipline fits into the day's activities. Be familiar with unique Flight Data File
for the activities. 
II. Listen closely when the crew talks. If you determine that the information doesn't affect your discipline then you may resume 
your discussions, unless they were on the flight loop. 
III. Condition yourself to react to A/G discussions without having to be prompted by the Flight Director. 
IV. When the crew's comments affect your discipline immediately follow their call with a tailored acknowledgment on the flight 
loop. For example: 
"WE COPY FLIGHT, STANDBY WHILE WE LOOK AT IT." 
"COPY FLIGHT, IT'S A TRANSDUCER FAILURE, NO ACTION." 
"WE COPY AND CONCUR FLIGHT." 
"COPY FLIGHT, HAVE THEN WORK MAL...." 
I. Listen closely to your instructions that get read to the crew. If it has been a while since you made the request for the uplink, 
report on the flight loop that you copied the uplink. This lets the flight director know the instructions were read as you intended 
and you are ready to observe the result. When the crew repeats uplinked instructions, particularly those with more than a couple
of steps, acknowledges on the flight loop with "GOOD READ BACK FLIGHT". 
II. Minimize you discussions on the flight loop when the crew is talking. Criticality of your need will dictate this. A good rule of 
thumb would be to wait so CAPCOM can listen, if waiting is possible. 
III. An ideal exchange between the crew and the MCC is one in which the Flight Director talks the least. In this case the Flight 
Director can use quick vocal approvals on the flight loop to enhance the efficiency of the communication. 
IV. Minimize discussion over the airways. Use loops unless impractical to do so. 
V. Be ahead of the crew in finding changes to procedures based on flight plan changes or previous failures. Look ahead. 
VI. Switch/circuit breaker actions should be called out with panel, row, and device nomenclature. 
VII. If you have time to write a flight note, write a flight note. 
VIII. Flight note and/or vocal actions should include what you want done, by when, and why. When vocalizing this the preferred order 
is to report what has happened followed by the action required within some time frame. For example: 
"FLIGHT, THE "A" HEATER ON XYZ JUST FAILED SO I WOULD LIKE THE CREW TO SWITCH TO THE "B" SIDE WITHIN 10 
MINUTES. THE SWITCH IS ON PANEL......" 
Last Updated: 7/4/96
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 Microgravity research 
laboratory assembled in orbit 
between 1998-2011, manned 
continuously since Nov 2000
 15+ Years!
• Components built by 
hundreds of companies across 
16 nations. 100+ launches from 
Florida, Virginia, Russia, Japan, 
and French Guiana 
• Research crew of 6 astronauts 
and cosmonauts serve 6 
month stays, rotating 3 at a 
time from Earth by a Russian 
Soyuz spacecraft
22
United States
Europe
Japan
Canada
Russia
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Truss: 109 m
Modules:
51 m
Solar Array:
35 m
Mass: 420,000 kg
Habitable Volume: 388 m3
Solar Power Generation Capability: 84 kW
Earth’s Only Microgravity Research Laboratory
Altitude: 415 km
Orbital Speed: 28,000 kph (7.8 km/sec)
Orbital Period: 90 minutes (16 
sunrises/sunsets per day)
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